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To Review Part I
To Review Part II

Though not much was said publicly at the time, during the first year of Bush’s
presidency, regime change in Iraq was the central target of the administ-
ration's foreign policy. Initially, the aim was to foster an Iraqi coup to oust
Saddam. As time passed, it became apparent the various Iraqi opposition
groups were disjointed and not strong enough to overthrow Saddam. They
would require some sort of military help from us. And then along came 9-11.

During this first year (2001), the Administration conducted a campaign of
escalating pressures on Iraq. I will attempt to highlight some of the major
programs directed at weakening Saddam, while simultaneously, increasing the
U.S. presence in the Mid-East. You will see how Saddam was squeezed in the
hopes it would trigger a reaction from him that could justify war.

Jan. 16, 2001 - Before the inauguration, a PNAC position paper reiterates that
Saddam is still in power. This same paper calls attention to the 1998 letter to
Clinton, signed by several cabinet nominees, seeking Saddam's removal.   It
notes little has been done to assist the Iraqi opposition or to build troop
strength in order to topple Saddam. This paper ends with: “Both should be
priorities i f the new administration is to succeed in removing Saddam from
power”.

Jan. 29, 2001- On the eve of the first National Security Council meeting,
President Bush meets with Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini, the leader of one of the
nation's largest mosques. Imam Qazwini said that, on Jan. 29, 2001 he met with
Mr. Bush at the White House. The president, he said, was supportive of efforts
to oust Mr. Hussein, but did not mention war as a means of doing so. “No
method was discussed at all; it was a general desire for regime change”. Iman
Qazwin, in a telephone interview, said he had spoken to Mr. Bush six or seven
times, before and after the 2000 election, about removing Mr. Hussein.

Jan 30 – Feb 1, 2001 - The first National Security Council meeting of the new
administration was held. The removal of Saddam Hussein was a central topic of
the meeting, according to former Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill.     At that
same meeting on Feb. 1st, Rumsfeld discussed what needed to be done in a
post-Saddam Iraq: "... dealing with the Kurds in the north, the oil fields, the
reconstruction of the country's economy, and the freeing of the Iraqi people."

Many today regard Paul O’Neill as nothing more than a disgruntled, fired
employee, much as Richard Clark has been reduced to insignificance. We all
recognize, in politics, the best way to avoid facing an opposing view, is to just
discredit the person presenting the opposing view. These two men served
our government faithfully for many years, and now everything they say is a lie?
I think not. In any event, those who question O’Neill and Clark would certainly
not doubt questions and concerns of Robert Novak.

Feb. 16, 2001 – 24 U.S . and British planes bomb 5 military targets some within 5
miles of Baghdad, knocking out military and radar facilities. This is the first
bombing in Iraq since 1998 when Clinton retaliated against Saddam for kicking
out the weapons inspectors.   President Bush's stance on the bombing was
that it was routine. Yet in Robert Novak’s column 2/26/05 titled "No Endgame",
he felt the raid must have been more than "routine", because the President “
refused to permit any administration officials from appearing on Sunday
television two days after the bombing”. "The president's own explanation at
his first press conference last Thursday was uncommunicative”, said Novak.
"No Endgame", seems to leave the reader in the dark, as Novak himself seems
to be. He is puzzled about the administration's plans regarding Iraq. Novak
says, “Actually, there is no doubt that Bush's overriding desire is to get rid of
Saddam." He also says, "National security expert, Richard Perle, an unofficial
Bush adviser, flatly predicts that the Iraqi president will be gone within a year.
Perle believes ... that a U.S.-financed opposition in Iraq can drive Saddam from
power”.

I had hoped to include some information from briefing transcripts of Colin
Powell. Unfortunately all of Powell's briefings containing the word Iraq in the
title, during 2001 have been removed from the Department of State Website

April 2001- The “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century” is
released to Dick Cheney. This study commissioned by James Baker affirms
that the U.S. is facing a critical energy shortage that could result in weakening
our 'power' position internationally.   "Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to
U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as to regional and global order, and to the
flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East.". The report
“recommends the use of 'military intervention' as a means to fix the U.S .
energy crisis”

Spring 2001 - the U .S . increas es funding to various Iraqi opposition and anti-
Saddam groups. Saddam would certainly have been aware of this increased
support of his enemies; it was freely reported in the Arab press (see link
above). On Feb. 12th, 2001 United Press International announced "In the next
month, a handful of Iraqi rebels are scheduled to go to College Station, Texas,
for their first round of weapons training from federal lawmen and members of
the military Special Forces under a U.S. plan to support insurgency activities
inside Iraq". This training was unique in that the trainees would be schooled in
the use of weapons, which had not been done before.

During the spring and summer of 2001, over 30 bombing raids were conducted
in Iraq to "enforce the no-fly zones". The targets were generally any military
target involved with Iraq's air defense. Often the Iraqi fired upon our planes,
and normally that would be considered by most Americans to be a justification
for our retaliatory bombing. We forget Iraq is a sovereign country and has a
right to protect it's air space, too. (Had Russia during the cold war decided
Alaska was a threat and decided to fly over, would we have fired on them?)

During that whole year we boldly targeted Saddam in various ways (see links at
end). I suggest our plan was to let Saddam know he was a marked man. We
were getting him ready, as we were getting ready, to go to war.

As I said earlier, not much was said about Iraq during that first year. In fact, in a
review of speeches between Mar. 14, 2001 and 9-11, it appears the president
made 407 speeches of some sort. Iraq was mentioned only 12 times, and only
one time did his comments address, briefly, activity in Iraq.

9/11/2001 - Al Queada attacks the U.S.

Sep. 12, 2001 - "Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq....we all said, 'but
no, no. Al Queada is in Afghanistan," recounts Richard Clarke, "and Rumsfeld
said, 'There aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good
targets in Iraq.'"

9-11 opened a new door. Terrorists could be anywhere...perhaps even in Iraq.
The path had been cleared. All that needed to be done, was convince the
people of this danger.   Echoes of Strauss: if there is no external threat,
manufacture one.

Links to actions not discussed (in order to keep down the size of Part III)
US & UK Attempts Stricter Sanctions on Iraq in UN
US Forces Enter Iraq 2 months before Congressional Resolution
US Employs U2 Spy Planes to Monitor Iraqi Air Defense System
US Authorizes Funding of Iraqi National Council Office within IRAN
The War Before the War - Bombings increase in 2002