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To Review Part I, P art II,   Part III
General Note 1
We will not devote any time to the war in Afghanistan. From the viewpoint of
the Administration, the action against Al Queada in Afghanistan was just an un-
welcome distraction from the main target, Iraq. America’s half-hearted pursuit
of Osama Bin Laden (as evidenced by the fact that he is still at large) did
provide some new ammunition for the Administration: (1) the American people
were now fully aware of the danger of terrorists, (2) the nation now had an
enemy to unite against, (3) the president could claim the role of war time
president, and (4) last, but not least, $700 million could be diverted from funds
designated for 9-11 relief to planning a war against Iraq that would not be
approved by Congress until three months later.

General Note 2.
Most everyone agrees Saddam is a barbarian. As a leader of his own people
he was a ruthless murderer and a plunderer. Within the Mid-East
neighborhood, he has been a constant, disruptive force. Everyone, today, is
happy he’s gone. But considering all his atrocities, none of those reasons are
internationally sufficient to overthrow a sovereign government. They were
insufficient particularly at the time the U.S. and England chose to invade Iraq.

Downing Street Memos - What are they?
Simply stated, they are a series of 8 authentic documents. They are various
briefing memos, position papers, opinions, reports, and minutes of meetings.
These are the recorded perceptions and thought processes shared amongst
the highest ranking cabinet members and the Prime Minister of England as
they contemplated going to war. These memos created between March and
July of 2002 , were leaked to a British newsman Michael Smith in 2005. Michael
Smith published the most revealing memo in the Sunday Times of London on
May 1st, 2005. Over time, subsequent memos that support the first memo have
surfaced and have been published.

Why are they so important?
These memos provide us with a snapshot in time of the conflicted interactions
of the British cabinet as it tries to justify and reconcile involving their country
in an alliance with an American administration who had already decided to go
to war with Iraq long before it was officially “decided”.

In this Part IV and in Part V we will provide a summary of these Various
Documents and some of the implications of them. Not all that was covered in
the memos will be discussed here. We are only concerned with those portions
of the memos that outline how the war was justified.

March 8, 2002, Title “Iraq: Legal Background.”
This document discusses the legal conditions which must first be met for
England to go to war with Iraq. Listed are three conditions: [UN.] Security
Council Resolutions, Self Defense and Humanitarian Intervention. England is a
member of the International Criminal Court so they have to carefully weigh the
legality of their war actions to avoid possible international prosecution. The
U.S, has withdrawn from the ICC, thus international legality is not even a
consideration. We offer, in very simplified language, the general conclusions
found in this document. With respect to the Security Council resolutions: at
this point in time [2002], the only area where Iraq is in violation of a resolution,
is by not providing proof of disarmament nor allowing inspectors to verify it.
This is a long standing condition, and to gain widespread support for action on
this point now, would be unlikely.   Self Defense: “For the exercise of the right
of self defense there must be more than “a threat”. There has to be an armed
attack actual or imminent. The development or possession of nuclear
weapons does not in itself amount to an armed attack.” (pg.3, #6) To sustain
this position, the author then points out that Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear
facility was strongly condemned in the UN. Humanitarian Intervention: There
must be a humanitarian catastrophe - and there is no evidence of a
humanitarian catastrophe occurring.

March 8, 2002 Titled “ Iraq: Options Paper".
This 10 page document discusses the various approaches Britain can take in
engaging Iraq.    It is apparent that many people contributed to this paper. The
document bounces from one paragraph where containment is said to have
worked in virtually stopping development of Saddam’s conventional arsenal,
Biological and Chemical weapons and the nuclear program While in the next
paragraph there is a list of statements refuting all of the above. This second
writer labels Saddam as extremely dangerous, who might use WMD’s upon
attack. Throughout all of these documents, the Brits readily admit their
intelligence is weak. This document goes into all of the options and conditions
the cabinet must consider before pursuing this war.   One paragraph I thought
was interesting “In the judgment of the JIC [Joint Intelligence Council], there is
no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is no
justification for action against Iraq based on action in self-defense…to combat
imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan…” ( pg. 9 #29.)

March 14, 2002, Titled “Your trip to U.S.”
A letter from David Manning [Foreign Policy Advisor equivalent to our National
Security Advisor] to Prime Minister Blair.
In this letter David Manning recounts his trip to the U.S. and his visit with
Condi Rice. He, at the same time, gives some advice to the Prime Minister
about what should be discussed with President Bush on the Prime Minister’s
upcoming trip. Manning has dinner with Condi and explains to her that
England is fully on board with Bush, even to the point of regime change in
Iraq. He points out a major problem is how to sell the war to the press,
parliament and the people “Condi” says that one of the problems facing Bush
was “how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is
necessary and justified”(pg 1, para 4). It is at this point we see the unfolding of
a British plan, to help swing public opinion: renewed weapons inspections
that Saddam will surely oppose. “The issue of the weapons inspectors must
be handled in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the
US was conscious of the international framework and the insistence of many
countries on the need for a legal base. Renwed [renewed] refused [refusal] by
Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument (pg 1,
para last).

March 18, 2002 Titled “Iraq and Afghanistan: Conversation with Wolfowitz".
A letter from Ambassador Christopher Meyer (British Embassy, Washington) to
David Manning.
Meyer’s luncheon with Paul Wolfowitz began with Meyer taking the same tack
as Manning did with Condi. “We backed regime change, but the plan had to be
clever and failure was not an option, if would be a tough sell domestically and
probably tougher elsewhere in Europe”(pg 1 para 2). Meyer brought up the
need for further weapons inspections to gather support from other countries.
He also offered that the UK was considering publishing a paper making a case
against Saddam, because people have forgotten how bad he really was.
Wolfowitz opined: that focus on the WMD’s was crucial in selling the public
case against Saddam, but he thought spelling out Saddam’s barbarism was
equally important. Wolfowitz thought this would help destroy the moral
equivalence between Iraq and Israel (with regard to Israel’s treatment of the
Palestinians).

March 22, 2002 Titled "Iraq: Advice for the Prime Minister"
A letter from P. F. Ricketts Political Director.
Ricketts voices many of the same concerns shared by other ministers and
pretty well parallels comments you will hear from Jack Straw who follows this
letter. I offer these 2 interesting quotes that give a peek at Ricketts' view of
the US' approach to this action with Iraq: "He [the Prime Minister] can help
Bush make good decisions by telling him things his own machine probably
isn't" (pg 1, #2) and "US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al
Aaida (Queada) is so far frankly unconvincing" (pg 1, #5)

March 25, 2002, Titled “Crawford/Iraq".
A letter to the Prime Minister from Jack Straw [Foreign Secretary equivalent to
our Secretary of State]
Judging from the tone of this letter, Jack Straw is a straight thinker, using few
words to outline his great concern for the welfare of his country first. He
starts the letter with “The rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few. The
risks are high, both for you and for the Government” (pg1, para.1). Straw
points out in rapid fire, the chinks in the justifications for invasion: we know
Iraq is bad, what’s different today than 2 or 3 years ago, why is Iraq worse than
Iran or North Korea, can we justify a military action legally, will a military
supported new government in Iraq result in a law abiding government. And
how can we act here, considering the Israel/ Palestinian conflict. In his “What is
Worse Now?” section he states, “there has been no credible evidence to link
Iraq with UBL [Osama Bin Laden] and Al Qaida. Objectively, the threat from Iraq
has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has, however, changed
[weakened] is the tolerance of the international community (especially that of
the U.S.), the world having witnessed on September 11 just what determined
evil people can these days perpetuate" (pg 2 #4).    Straw offers advice on how
to answer some of these questions, but cautions that everything possible
should be done to avoid pitfalls. He is firmly in favor of a new round of
unfettered weapons inspections and though he is aware a new UN resolution
would bolster support, he is concerned that a new resolution may turn out to
be a resolution against military action with 13 supporting and only 2 opposing
and that would be really bad. He like many of the other ministers is concerned
about what follows Saddam. "How can there be any certainty that the
replacement regime will be better" (pg 4, #10)

Next time in Part V - We will review the more formal Downing Street Memos.