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To Review Part I, P art II,   Part III    Part IV

The last two of the memos (July 2002) are more formalized memos. They
represent a shift to "group-think" rather than individual thoughts. This change
results in bringing together the most important concerns. Those concerns
that must be addressed in order to partner with the US in attacking and
forcibly overthrowing the government of Iraq, while protecting Britain. .

July 21, 2002   Titled “Iraq: Conditions for Military Action" (A Note by Officials)

This is a detailed appraisal of all of the important items that must be
considered before going to war. This document includes the deals made
between Bush and Blair, an analysis of the American plan and how that might
affect the British. It lays out the rules that must be followed to protect the UK.
It's a call for all ministers to review and comment on the overall plan as it
stands at this moment. The intent of "Conditions for Military Action" is to
ensure overall direction is not lost as details of the plan are perfected.
Below is a commentary outlining these points:
1.        We must act legally. Regime change cannot be the goal. The UK's goal
is to establish a stable law-abiding Iraq free from WDM’s. Regime change may
be a result, but cannot be the goal. Even though the U.S, has as its objective:
the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, followed by the elimination of Iraqi
WMD”, the UK must be clear in its direction.
2.        Further UN weapons inspections are a must. Inspections will gain
support from other nations and if Saddam defaults in any way, it would lead to
justification for an invasion.
3.        The UK military is not in agreement with the US strategy of using a
running-start approach beginning in November 2002. They disagree in
principle with the tactic, and don't feel they could marshal a sufficient force in
time. The British do recognize that the political climate in the United States
probably would not allow for an invasion until Jan. 2003, at which time they
could be ready.
4.        There is a persistent concern for the endgame. What’s after Saddam?
They are concerned that the Bush administration has not planned for this
adequately. The Brits think the US has unreal expectations of how easy this
will be: “A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly
nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are
virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a
disproportionate share of the burden” (#19)
5.        “Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is
necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also
need to be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament.” (#20)

Finally we arrive at the original, Infamous “Downing Street Memo”.   The
first published document that caused all of the furor, except in the American
Media, where it was already considered old news.

July 23 2002 Titled “Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 23 July”
Minutes of the meeting prepared by Matthew Rycroft and sent to David
Manning.

This last document is the actual minutes of a meeting of the chief designers of
the UK's Iraq policy. Now you see all of the various players working as a group
to fashion a plan that is both effective and safe for the United Kingdom.
Principles outlined in this meeting must be considered in all future planning
for the war with Iraq.

Aside from the discussion about various military plans, the more important
points covered by this meeting for this discussion are quoted below:
1.        “C [Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, foreign intelligence] reported on his
recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military
action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through
military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC [U. S.
National Security Council] had no patience with the UN route, and no
enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was
little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.”   Note:
“The intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” is considered
to be the most damning part of this memo.
2.        “The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of
activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he
thought the most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was
January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the U.S. Congressional
elections”.   Note: these “spikes of activity” relate to the “War before the War"
cited in Part III. Please also note the troop build up period would coincide with
the election period, that would be keeping the press occupied.
3.        “The Foreign Secretary would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It
seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if
the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not
threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya,
North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to
allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force”.
4.        “The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically
and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change
and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing
the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the
political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key
issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political
strategy to give the military plan the space to work”.

What is most interesting to me, after reading all of these memos, is that it
appears not only the United States was playing a game of “The intelligence
and facts being fixed around the policy” The British faced a somewhat
different yet similar dilemma: they had to drum up a legal basis plus convince
their people to go to war with a country where the reasons to do so weren't
readily apparent.

Part VI - Back in the USA - The Conclusion.